Abstract: NATO has taken over the role of UN world police, and we spend larger and larger sums to get Muslim tribal warriors and our own soldiers killed in Central Asia as one of several steps by the global power elite to usurp the last remnants of regional autonomy to complete their world dictatorship. In this situation a totally unexpected message comes from the power elite´s "invisible" world government center, the U.S. Council on Foreign Relations, that the war on terrorism is quite unacceptable because the risk of terror death outside the war zones is negligible! The risk of dying from terrorism in the U.S. is 1: 101,000 a year, only half as great as the risk of dying by using household appliances, and one fourth the risk of dying in a traffic accident. For the United States just to get up to the borderline of what is in other contexts considered unacceptable would every year require a terrorist attack the size of 9/11, which was most likely a U.S. inside job. Al Qaeda has probably never set its terrorist footprints in the U.S. But the Council on Foreign Relations does not think their analysis will have any impact, since we have been brainwashed to believe this terror cock-and-bull story as well.
The real reason for the war on terror is - besides the futile attempt to conquer Central Asia - to introduce more and more monitoring of our societies in order to subdue dissatisfaction with the implementation of the New World Order dictatorship.


Since the home-made, inside terrorism of 9/11, the world has been mobilising, spending enormous sums under the excuse of “war on terrorism”. NATO has utilized the situation, grabbing the job as the UN´s military expeditionary force to fight terror anywhere in the world, i.e. to crush all surmountable resistance to the march of the New World order – so much praised by prominent politicians in the US and Europe (see video on right margin of this blog). Other crises were made by the illuminists (professed by the EU (explanatory statement): A financial crisis, and here, and here, the fraudulent, and here, and here home-grown  climate crisis, a terrible hoax, the “crisis” for biological diversity etc.) at the same time – all serving as an excuse for unprecedented power grabbing by the elite of this New World Order over us underlings – at our increasing cost.
Therefore, it is sensational that this exposure is done by “Foreign Affairs”, the Magazine of the US Council on Foreign Relations, the invisible government of the US and so of the world, Rockefeller-Rothschild´s strongest tool.

John Mueller and Mark Stewart, Foreign Affairs 2 April 2010  Over the last several decades, academics, policymakers, and regulators worldwide have developed risk-assessment techniques to evaluate hazards to human life, such as pesticide use, pollution, and nuclear power plants. In the process, they have reached a substantial consensus about which risks are acceptable and which are unacceptable. When these techniques are applied to terrorism, it becomes clear that terrorism is far from an existential threat. Instead, it presents an acceptable risk, one so low that spending to further reduce its likelihood or consequences is scarcely justified. Typically, risks considered Intlter2unacceptable are those found likely to kill more than 1 in 10,000 or 1 in 100,000 per year.

 Persons killed by terrorism over the years. Red line: US DOS Data. Blue line: RAND/MIPT Data.

At the other end of the spectrum are risks that are considered acceptable, and there is a fair degree of agreement about that area of risk as well. For example, after extensive research and public consultation, the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission decided in 1986 that the fatality risk posed by accidents at nuclear power plants should not exceed 1 in 2 million per year and 1 in 500,000 per year from nuclear power plant operations. The governments of Australia, Japan, and the United Kingdom have come up with similar numbers for assessing hazards. So did a review  of 132 U.S. federal government regulatory decisions dealing with public exposure to environmental carcinogens, which found that regulatory action always occurred if the individual annual fatality risk exceeded 1 in 700,000. Impressively, the study found a great deal of consistency among a wide range of federal agencies about what is considered an acceptable level of risk.

There is a general agreement about risk, then, in the established regulatory practices of several developed countries: risks are deemed unacceptable if the annual fatality risk is higher than 1 in 10,000 or perhaps higher than 1 in 100,000 and acceptable if the figure is lower than 1 in 1 million or 1 in 2 million. Between these two ranges is an area in which risk might be considered "tolerable."  Vastly more lives could have been saved if counterterrorism funds had instead been spent on combating hazards that present unacceptable risks.

These established considerations are designed to provide a viable, if somewhat rough, guideline for public policy. In all cases, measures and regulations intended to reduce risk must satisfy essential cost-benefit considerations. Clearly, hazards that fall in the unacceptable range should command the most attention and resources. Those in the tolerable range may also warrant consideration — but since they are less urgent, they should be combated with relatively inexpensive measures. Those hazards in the acceptable range are of little, or even negligible, concern, so precautions to reduce their risks even further would scarcely be worth pursuing unless they are remarkably inexpensive.
If the U.S. Department of Homeland Security wants to apply a risk-based approach to decision-making, as it frequently claims it does, these risk-acceptance criteria seem to be most appropriate to this end.    Mueller

As can be seen, annual terrorism fatality risks, particularly for areas outside of war zones, are less than one in one million and therefore generally lie within the range regulators deem safe or acceptable, requiring no further regulations, particularly those likely to be expensive. They are similar to the risks of using home appliances (200 deaths per year in the United States) or of commercial aviation (103 deaths per year). Compared with dying at the hands of a terrorist, Americans are twice as likely to perish in a natural disaster and nearly a thousand times more likely to be killed in some type of accident. The same general conclusion holds when the full damage inflicted by terrorists — not only the loss of life but direct and indirect economic costs — is aggregated. As a hazard, terrorism, at least outside of war zones, does not inflict enough damage to justify substantially increasing expenditures to deal with it.. The table also includes another kind of hazard that arouses strong emotions and is intentional — homicide — and its frequency generally registers, unlike terrorism, in the unacceptable category.

In order to deal with the emotional and political aspects of terrorism, a study recently conducted for the U.S. Department of Homeland Security suggested that lives lost to terrorism should be considered twice as valued as those lost to other hazards. That is, $1 billion spent on saving one hundred deaths from terrorism might be considered equivalent to $1 billion spent on saving two hundred deaths from other dangers. But even with that generous (and perhaps morally questionable) bias, or even with still more generous ones, counterterrorism expenditures fail a standard cost-benefit assessment.

Politicians and bureaucrats do, of course, face considerable political pressure to deal with terrorism, but that does not relieve them of their responsibility to expend public funds wisely. If they feel they cannot do so, they should resign or forthrightly admit that they are being irresponsible — or they should have refused to take the job in the first place. Moreover, although political pressures may force unwise actions and expenditures, they usually do not dictate the precise amount of money spent. The United Kingdom, which seems to face a considerably greater internal threat from terrorism than the United States, nonetheless spends only half as much per capita on homeland security — at no notable cost to the tenure of its politicians and bureaucrats.

To border on becoming unacceptable by established risk conventions — that is, to reach an annual fatality risk of 1 in 100,000 — the number of fatalities from terrorist attacks in the United States and Canada would have to increase 35-fold; in Great Britain (excluding Northern Ireland), more than 50-fold; and in Australia, more than 70-fold. For the United States, this would mean experiencing attacks on the scale of 9/11 at least once a year, or 18 Oklahoma City bombings every year.

For this to come about, terrorists would probably have to acquire nuclear weapons, the likelihood of which is highly questionable. If that fear is deemed viable, however, the policy implications would be to spend entirely, or almost entirely, on dealing with that limited concern. Massive expenditures to protect "critical infrastructure," for example, are unlikely to be effective against a nuclear explosion.

In fact, there is little evidence that terrorists are becoming any more destructive, particularly in the West. Some analysts have found that, if anything, terrorist activity is diminishing, at least outside of war zones. As a hazard to human life in the United States, or in virtually any country outside of a war zone, terrorism under present conditions presents a threat that is hardly existential. Applying widely accepted criteria established after much research by regulators and decision-makers, the risks from terrorism are low enough to be deemed acceptable. Overall, vastly Obama-devil-hand.2jpgmore lives could have been saved if counterterrorism funds had instead been spent on combating hazards that present unacceptable risks.

This elemental observation is unlikely to change anything, however. The cumulative increased cost of counterterrorism for the United States alone since 9/11 — the federal, state, local, and private expenditures as well as the opportunity costs (but not the expenditures on the wars in Iraq or Afghanistan) — is approaching $1 trillion. However dubious and wasteful, this enterprise has been internalized, becoming, in Washington parlance, a "self-licking ice cream cone," and it will likely last as long as terrorism does. Since terrorism, like crime, can never be fully expunged, the United States seems to be in for a long and expensive siege.

Satanist-george_bushThis is sobering talk from a totally unexpected New World Order side. So, why on Earth are our soldiers dying, fighting ghosts in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq? Al Qaida? it is just a figment of the imagination - consisting of a few hundred scared, primitive warriors trying to hide in Pakistan and Yemen! The truth is that this war on terror was an invented pretext by the US military complex forcing weak and corrupt US presidents with a Satanistic background – father and son – to start what has always made the banksters behind them richer and more powerful. Besides Central Asia is the centre of Brzezinski´s Eurasian Grand Chessboard which has to be controlled for the implementation of the Trilateral Commission´s one world state, linking the NAFTA/NAU, the Euromediterranean area and the ASEAN + 3. We, the brainwashed subhuman slaves deliver the money and our offspring – to ”make a (totally unnecessary) difference”, i.e. to be destroyed. However, it is remarkable that the strongest army the world has ever seen, NATO, cannot even defeat medieval Muslim tribesmen in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Instead they are chasing even more of those unintegrable Muslims to the West to be nourished by us, thus destroying our social states, cultures, morals, and independence. This is also part of the New World Order plan, in order to change our societies radically and to introduce total surveillance, and here, to be able toimplement the New World Order dictatorship and subdue resistance to it.

. We are simply too stupid, allowing that to happen. Or too brainwashed. In stead the resources should be spent on protecting domestic populations in the West against the increasing, daily terror in our cities from the never adapted immigrants – or better: to keep them out of a world and a culture, where they have nothing to seek but to be paid for expanding the Sharia at our cost – and then channel this internal Muslim problem into other Muslim countries. Islam has already grabbed much more than sufficient land from Christianity in the course of history.